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The Evil God Challenge: Two Significant Asymmetries
Dr. Carlo Alvaro
New York City College of Technology

Abstract
Several authors have maintained that every argument in support of God, indeed everything that a
theist claims about God, can be reversed and used in support of an evil god. The most salient
example is the alleged symmetry between theodicies and reverse theodicies: God gave us free
will to promote good, evil god gave us free will to promote evil; God allows evil for soul
making, evil god allows good for soul destruction; our suffering is compensated for by the
eternal bliss in the afterlife, our happiness is compensated for by the eternal damnation in the
afterlife. Considering such symmetries, it is argued that there is no reason to think that the
existence of God is more plausible than the existence of an evil god. The foregoing reasoning is
known as the evil god challenge. The challenge is to explain why the God hypothesis should be
considerably more reasonable than the evil god hypothesis. In this paper, I take up the challenge
on behalf of theism. I indicate damaging asymmetries between an evil god and a good god, and
between theodicies and reverse theodicies, showing that the existence of a good god is
considerably more plausible than the existence of an evil god.
Keywords: Evil god challenge; God; Symmetry; Incompleteness
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The Evil God Challenge: Two Significant Asymmetries
Introduction
Stephen Law and many other authors have defended an argument against theism known
as the evil god challenge. The challenge is to explain, ‘Why the good-god hypothesis should be
considered significantly more reasonable than the evil-god hypothesis.’1 The good god
hypothesis is the classical claim of monotheism that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent being. And the evil god hypothesis is, as it were, the evil mirror image of
classical monotheism, i.e., a being that has the same attributes as God except that, instead of
being omnibenevolent, he is omnimalevolent. According to the evil god argument, since the evil
god hypothesis is not significantly less plausible than the good god hypothesis, and since the evil
god hypothesis is absurd, we should conclude that the good god hypothesis is absurd as well.2 In
this paper, I call attention to significant asymmetries between God and evil god. If correct, such
asymmetries show that the existence of a good god should be considered as significantly more
plausible than the existence of an evil god, and thus the evil god challenge will be met. After a
brief summary of the evil god challenge, I indicate two asymmetries which show that the
existence of an evil god is implausible. Or, if such a being exists, he must lack certain divine
attributes, and thus he is not a god, but perhaps a subordinate to God (Henceforth, I will use GG
for God or good god, and EG for evil god). The asymmetries that I shall propose are (I) the
Incompleteness, which purports to show that EG is not a god. And (II) Asymmetries between
theodicies, which intend to show that the problem of evil and the problem of good are not
symmetrical.
One preliminary remark is necessary. The challenge is imprecise for many reasons, two
of which are the following. First maltheism is not clearly defined, and consequently it is difficult
to discuss a particular mirror-image theistic position. Second, and most important, is the question
of whether the challenge is to explain why belief in an evil god is implausible or to explain why
the existence of an evil god is implausible; or whether if there is a god, what reason is there to
assume that he is good.3 At any rate, the challenge can be met by considering that even the very
challengers note that belief in EG is absurd, and consequently the existence of such a being is
quite implausible. As Ben Page & Max Baker-Hytch note, ‘belief in an evil god and belief in a
good god are taken to be similarly preposterous.’4 In fact, it is important to note that the EG
Law, S. (2010) “The evil-god challenge”, Religious Studies 46, 372.
Law, 360.
3
Hendricks, P. (2018). Sceptical theism and the evil‐god challenge. Religious Studies, 1– 13. (endnote 3) also notes
Law has two different formulations of the challenge in his article. One is that if belief in EG is unreasonable, then
belief in GG is unreasonable. Belief in EG is unreasonable. Therefore, belief in GG is unreasonable. The other is,
“the challenge is to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good god should
be considered significantly more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and allevil god” (2010, 353). From Law’s public presentation of the challenge, it appears that another formulation can be
the following: Give me a good reason why, if there is one, God is wholly good instead of wholly evil.
4
Page, B., and Baker‐Hytch, M. (2020) “Meeting the EG Challenge” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,
https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12304, 1.
1
2
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challenge is fundamentally an argument for atheism. To my knowledge, no challenger has ever
professed to be a devout maltheist. Thus, I shall consider the question of whether an evil god can
exist. The asymmetries that I propose, therefore, are meant to show that, while an EG is quite
implausible—as the very challengers admit—the existence of God is quite plausible. Therefore, I
conclude that EG cannot exist or, at least, than the existence of such a being is significantly less
plausible that the existence of a good god.
The evil god challenge
The first order of business is to give a brief summary of Law’s EG challenge. But in
order to explain the challenge, it is necessary to understand
(i) The GG and the EG hypotheses
(ii) a. The problem of evil
(ii) b. The problem of good
(iii) The symmetry thesis.
(i) Good god/evil god hypotheses
The good god hypothesis is the claim of traditional monotheism according to which there
exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being, which monotheistic religions refer
to as God.5 Conversely, the evil god hypothesis is the claim that there exists an omnipotent,
omniscient, but omnimalevolent being, EG.
(ii) The problem of evil/The problem of good
(ii). a. The Problem of Evil
There are two formulations of the classical problem of evil, a logical and an evidential.
Both versions rely upon two claims,
(1) There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being, GG.
And
(2) Evil exists in the world.
According to the logical formulation, claim (1) is logically inconsistent with (2), provided
that these claims include a number of other implicit premises. According to the evidential
formulation, claim (2) provides us with good evidence against the existence of GG.
In general, the problem of evil, whether in the logical or in the evidential form, is an
argument used in order to question the existence of GG. That is, it would seem implausible

5

A theist may regard this as an incomplete definition of God. She may wish to note other attributes and descriptions.
For example, God is endowed with freedom of the will, he is perfect, he is omnitemporal, and more. However, here
I follow the literature.
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(according to the evidential) or impossible (according to the logical) that a wholly benevolent,
wholly intelligent, and wholly powerful being allows evil to exist in the world. Based upon his
attributes, GG can, and ought to, prevent or eliminate evil. But evil exists in the world.
Consequently, according to the logical version, either GG does not exist, or he lacks one or more
of the aforementioned divine attributes. According to the evidential version, there is good
evidence against GG. Theists, over the centuries, have offered several theodicies. The following
are three examples: 1. God gave us free will in order for us to be good, although the very same
freedom enables us to do morally vicious actions; 2. evil is required for the moral growth of
human character; and 3. the suffering we undergo in our lifetimes is compensated for by the
eternal bliss of the afterlife.6
(ii) b. The Problem of Good
The problem of good, according to EG challengers, may be set up in a symmetrical way
as follows.
(1) There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnimalevolent being, EG.
And
(2) Good exists in the world.
The problem of good, it is argued, would have two symmetrical formulations. According
to the logical formulation, claim (1) is logically inconsistent with (2). According to the evidential
formulation, claim (2) provides us with good evidence against the existence of EG. The problem
of good is an argument used in order to question the existence of EG. That is, it would seem
implausible or impossible that a wholly malevolent, wholly intelligent, and wholly powerful
being allows good in the world to exist. Based upon his attributes, EG can, and ought to, prevent
or eliminate good. Perhaps there are goods that he can allow in order to bring about greater evils
(he just cannot allow goods that are not conducive to evil—they are just purely good)—which is
analogous to GG and the problem of evil. But good exists in the world. Consequently, either EG
does not exist or he lacks one or more of the aforementioned divine attributes. EG challengers
may offer the following reverse theodicies: EG gave us free will in order for us to be evil,
although the very same freedom enables us to do morally virtuous actions; good is required for
the moral destruction of our character; and the good we undergo in our lifetimes is compensated
for by the eternal damnation of the afterlife.
(iii) The symmetry thesis
The symmetry thesis purports to show a symmetry between the degree of reasonableness
of the GG and EG hypotheses. Law argues that theodicies are isomorphic to their reverse

6

Since the purpose of this paper is not a discussion on the problem of evil, or the problem of good for that matter,
here I give a sketch of the two problems. For a more detailed exposition of the problem of evil, see Tooley, Michael,
"The Problem of Evil", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/evil/>. Regarding the problem of good see The Problem
of Good When the World Seems Fine without God edited by D. Marion Clark
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theodicies.7 Moreover, EG challengers claim that any theistic argument for the existence of God
can be parodied by a maltheistic mirror image argument for the existence of an evil god. Thus,
the symmetry thesis is the claim that theism and maltheism are broadly symmetrical. Page and
Baker-Hytch give a more specific exposition of the symmetry thesis. They observe that it
comprises three sub points:
(A) Intrinsic symmetry: the concept of an all powerful, all knowing, all evil deity
is about as intrinsically plausible and coherent as the concept of an all powerful,
all knowing, all good deity. (B) Natural theology symmetry: natural theological
evidence (e.g. the apparent ‘finetuning’ of the universe; phenomenal
consciousness; religious experience; objective moral values and duties; etc.) lends
roughly equal support to GG and EG alike. (C) Theodicy symmetry: most of the
significant theodicies which try to explain why a GG might allow such a
tremendous amount of evil can be ‘mirrored’ with about as much plausibility so
as to yield reverse-theodicies which try to explain why an EG might allow such a
tremendous amount of goodness.8
In short, the ultimate purpose of the symmetry thesis is to show that theism and
maltheism are both absurd. Why? Because according to the challenge, maltheism and theism are
equally improbable. In what follows, I will attempt to show that there are significant
asymmetries between EG and GG and between theodicies—asymmetries that are supposed to
show that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God is quite plausible
while the existence of EG is implausible, or at least it is significantly less plausible than the
existence of GG.
Asymmetries
Having explained the challenge, in what follows I will indicate some important
asymmetries. Then, I will consider some objections and my responses to such objections.
Asymmetry I. An Argument from Incompleteness
The first asymmetry may be formulated as an argument that shows the incompleteness of
EG as follows:
Premise I. Most theist (and also atheist would be willing to accept such a premise) regard
God as a perfect being.
Premise II. Perfection implies that God cannot be improved by anything, including
creation. In other words, perfection implies that God is complete.
Premise III. Thus, GG does not need to create the world, because he is already perfect.
By definition, a perfect being cannot be perfected further or benefitted by the creation of the
world. So he creates the world for our benefit.
Premise IV. An evil god does not create the world for our benefit, but for his own (i.e.

7
8

Law, 356-357.
Ben Page Max Baker Hytchm, 2.
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either to take joy in our suffering or to maximize evil).9
Premise V. Since EG creates the world to benefit from if, due to his own desire to
maximize evil, EG is not perfect.
Premise VI. It follows that EG is incomplete and therefore imperfect because he needs to
create the world to achieve his goal. On the other hand, GG is already complete and therefore
perfect because he doesn’t need to create the world.
Conclusion. Therefore, EG cannot be a god, and thus his nature undermines the EG
challenge.
Exposition
Law suggests, ‘[Evil god] is maximally evil. His depravity is without limit. His cruelty
knows no bounds.’10 Thus, EG creates the world to satisfy his desire to inflict and maximize evil,
and therefore he needs the existence of humans; without humans, it would seem, EG could not
accomplish his goal to maximize evil. If EG is omnipotent and omniscient and yet he created the
world, it seems to follow that he could not have maximized evil without creation. My point is
that EG is omniscient and omnipotent and maximally evil. But if he were maximally evil, there
would be no reason for him to bring about the world in order to maximize evil—maximization
would already be accomplished. And since humans do not desire to experience evil, it follows
that EG creates the world to satisfy his personal need for evil. In fact, EG is so wicked, according
to Law, that he has ‘no difficulty duping human beings into believing he is good.’11
One may note the possibility that GG has desires too—such as to share his goodness or
his love with other creatures, as many theists seem to think. Does it count as a need? And if it
doesn’t, why can’t this apply to EG as well? Such an observation, however, does not succeed in
eliminating the asymmetry; for even if it is assumed that GG has the desire to share his goodness,
his desire is ‘other-regarding.’ On the other hand, EG’s desire cannot be but self-regarding. In
other words, GG has an ‘other-regarding’ desire to share his goodness with humans for the
benefit of humans. However, GG’s desire is not symmetrical to EG’s because EG has a selfregarding desire to inflict evil upon humans. One may further note that the symmetry does exist
between the two gods insofar as it is assumed that they both create the world for their glory.
However, such an observation highlights precisely my point—it is implausible, perhaps
impossible, that a perfect being, omniscient, and omnipotent needs glory. People crave glory
simply because they think that it would satisfy the ideal life, to be respected by others, or just to
show off, factors that should not matter to a perfect being.
Here I want to draw attention to important asymmetries. First, considering EG’s goal to
maximize evil, it is understandable that EG would dupe human beings into believing that he is
good. EG challengers do not have to accept this claim. However, if they do, such a claim is
asymmetrical to GG’s goal. GG’s goal is to create a world that benefits humans, but GG does not
As noted in endnote 4, the evil god challenge is unclear on the purpose of evil god. I take it that EG’s ultimate goal
is to take joy from the maximization of evil.
10
Law, 356.
11
Law, 362
9
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dupe humans into believing that he is evil. Second, according to theism, GG could have
continued to exist without creation. GG does not need humans or the universe. Creation is
neither beneficial nor detrimental to him. Can it be claimed a symmetry between EG and GG?
Consider that EG, like GG, would have to be a perfect being, endowed with free will. As a
perfect being, GG does not need creation. Creation is neither beneficial nor detrimental to him.
On the other hand, either by necessity or by choice EG allegedly creates the world and ‘dupes
human beings into believing he is good.’ But if EG needs to create the world and needs to dupe
humans into believing that he is good in order to maximize evil, then creation is beneficial to
him. The maximization of evil, after all, does not benefit humans—it benefits EG. On the other
hand, GG creates the world not for his own benefit, but for ours, without duping us into believing
that he is evil.
Law observes, ‘By giving us something wonderful for a moment, and then gradually
pulling it away, an EG can make us suffer even more than if we had never had it in the first
place.’12 The point is, Law suggests, that inflicting evil and maximizing evil are what ‘he [EG]
desires.’13 Since EG is like GG, and GG does not need to create anything, why does EG need the
world to maximize evil? If he is omnipotent, perfect, and infinitely intelligent, why does he need
to create anything at all? Law might respond, 'Why does GG need to create anything at all?’ But
GG does not need to create anything at all. GG is good and creates the world for our benefit out
of his infinite goodness. The EG challenger must respond that, since he is evil, EG creates the
world to harm us out of his infinite evilness. But doesn’t EG create the world in order to
maximize evil? In that case, EG creates the world in order to benefit from it. The asymmetry is
that GG does not create the world to benefit from it. And if EG can be benefited from creation,
then he cannot be a god.
But suppose that EG challengers say, ‘Okay you’re right, and so I take back the claim
that EG creates in order to maximize evil, just as I take back the claim that GG creates in order to
maximize good.’ Now we have the parallel again. What is the objection now?14 However, taking
back those claims is not sufficient to avoid the asymmetry. EG challengers would have to explain
why an all-powerful and all-knowing (which implies perfection) being creates the world.
Granted, GG defenders also need an explanation. And the explanation, as I noted above, is that
GG’s creation is other-regarding. On the other hand, EG’s creation cannot be but self-regarding,
hence the asymmetry.
A reviewer makes the following objection here.
Pointing out that EG’s creation is self-regarding rather than other-regarding
doesn’t establish the needed asymmetry to block the Evil God Challenge. Of
course EG’s creation is entirely self-regarding, EG is wholly evil. The nub of the
asymmetry here is that GG is complete (independent of creation), while EG is
incomplete (dependent on creation). Showing the manner in which EG relates to
creation does not establish THAT EG is incomplete without creation.
12

Law, 358.
Law, 371.
14
This objection has been suggested to me by an anonymous reviewer.
13
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However, it seems to me that the observation that EG’s creation is self-regarding does
establish the needed asymmetry. That is, why does a perfect being perform self-regarding
actions? A self-regarding action, after all, affects no one other than the agent. Here the
asymmetry reappears. If EG performs self-regarding actions, and (somehow) affects/benefits
himself, it follows that EG is not complete, because his self-regarding actions will bring about
some benefit to his nature. On the other hand, GG’s actions, which are other-regarding, affect
only others. Therefore, it follows that EG’s self-regarding behavior shows that EG is in some
way benefitted by such behavior. It would seem to be peculiar, to say the least, that EG is
complete (perfect) and yet he performs self-regarding actions. Note that EG evidently does not
love humans. Rather he hates them. But then, why would EG bother creating beings that he hates
as a self-regarding action. The most plausible explanation is that EG is incomplete without
creation. If he were complete, perfect, all-powerful, and all-knowing as it is claimed, it would be
absurd that he would create beings that he hates.
Furthermore, why does EG need the world to maximize evil? If he is omnipotent, perfect,
and infinitely intelligent, why does he need to create anything at all? Suppose EG exists. Since
he is evil, it implies that he is not good and thus there exists a standard of good to which EG fails
to comply. But where does such a standard come from? Then, there must be a being that is the
paradigm of moral obligations, the same obligations that EG disobeys. It follows that if EG
exists, then GG exists, and therefore EG is not like GG, but rather subordinate to GG.
This last observation takes us straight to the famous Euthyphro Dilemma: ‘Is the pious
loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?’15 Atheists
regard the dilemma as the ultimate argument showing an inconsistency in theism’s concept of
God. Theists claim that God establishes the moral rules of the universe and we know these rules
by his commands. Triumphantly, many atheists ask whether a command is good simply because
God commands it or whether God says that a command is good because he recognizes some
moral standard beyond himself. By expressing the dilemma in these terms, atheists set up a false
dilemma that forces the theist to choose between two dire options—one that makes God’s
commands arbitrary or the other that makes him subservient to some higher moral standards. The
first possibility is what philosophers call the ‘divine command theory’ of ethics, which holds that
moral principles derive their validity or ‘rightness’ simply from God’s commanding them. The
ultimate foundation for morality is the mere fact that God reveals his commands to humanity.
For this to be true, atheists argue, morality would be arbitrary, subject to God’s whim, which he
could change whenever he wants. Today murder is wrong, but maybe not so tomorrow. Or
perhaps God could have simply declared from eternity past that murder is good. On this view,
God decides what is moral and what is not. Theists reject this view because morality does not
appear to be arbitrary—we seem to have fairly consistent moral intuitions that certain things are
objectively right/wrong. Now the typical atheist’s challenge assumes that if we deny the first
horn of his dilemma, then we must accept the second—which allegedly takes the theist from the
frying pan right into the fire. That is to say, if God cannot simply call things right or wrong, then
15

(Plato, Euthyphro, Hackett, 2002, 10a)
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he must be subject to some higher law that defines right and wrong. This makes God subordinate
to some value that exists independently of himself. We seem to be left with the choice that God
is not good or that he is not supreme.
I argue that this is a textbook example of a false dilemma. There is a third option that
atheists fail to consider.16 An objective moral standard does exist, which avoids the first half of
the dilemma, but it is internal to God—not external to him—which avoids the second half of the
dilemma. God’s eternal and unchangeable character is perfectly good, so his commands are not
arbitrary, but rooted in his righteous nature. Therefore, it is impossible for him to issue
unrighteous commands. In other words, morality is neither independent of God nor arbitrary.
Rather, morality is internally fixed in God’s nature. Morality is grounded in God’s character,
which expresses itself in his commands. God’s commands, then, flow from his moral nature,
which is loving, generous, just, kind, magnanimous, and so on. Consequently, whatever a GG
commands will always be good. Thus, God is the standard of moral obligations. If EG exists, and
he chooses to disobey such standards, then God exists, and this observation ultimately
undermines the very purpose of the EG challenge.
The point is that according to classical monotheism, GG freely creates the universe and
humans for their benefit. A perfect, omnipotent, and omniscient being, endowed with free will,
cannot be supposed to create something for his own benefit since such a being lacks nothing.
Thus, the GG hypothesis is plausible. GG freely chooses to create the world for humans out of
his infinite goodness. However, what reason could EG have to create the world? If he is perfect,
like GG, he does not need to improve his nature by creating the world. Moreover, as Peter
Forrest observes, it is implausible that a being whose nature is destructive be motivated to create
the world in the first place.17 In other words, it is plausible that GG creates the world because he
does it out of his infinite goodness and for our benefit. Alternatively, it may be conceded that
creation pleases GG. By symmetry, however, would the EG challenger have to claim that
creation pleases or displeases EG? If creation displeases him, then it is implausible that he
created anything. And if it is claimed that creation pleases him, this seems to lead to an internal
contradiction, because according to the EG hypothesis, EG hates humans and it is the
maximization of evil through the suffering of humans, and not creation, that pleases him. In
other words, creation pleases GG because it is beneficial to humans. Conversely, EG is not
interested in benefiting humans—he hates humans. Obviously, EG is not interested in our
destruction and in maximizing evil for our benefit—but for his.

16

Alston P. William discusses a similar response to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Alston, P. William. What Euthyphro
Should Have Said, in William Lane Craig (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide. Edinburgh University
Press. pp. 283-298 (2002)

Forrest, Peter (2012) “Replying to the anti-God challenge: a God without character acts well”, Religious Studies,
48, 35-43, 2, 37.
17
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How does this asymmetry show that EG is less plausible than GG? The implausibility, in
the light of these considerations, is brought to the fore by the claim that EG is a being whose
nature is supposed to exemplify perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience, a being that lacks
nothing, that can be perfected or benefited by nothing, and yet chooses to create imperfect, finite
creatures, whom he hates, to take joy from their suffering. Without creation, EG could never
accomplish such a predicament. But if he is like GG, he cannot be enhanced, improved or
perfected by creation. It cannot be said that a complete being created the universe and humans to
fill the void of loneliness because this would imply imperfection. Only finite beings create things
and need company. We humans build things, write books, eat food, and seek the company of
others because we are not complete. However, a perfect being such as a god lacks nothing and
does not require company, food, books, a college degree, friends, humans, or the existence of the
universe. This conclusion follows from an analysis of perfection. Consequently, EG cannot be
the malevolent version of God. At best, EG can be a malevolent, finite being that wishes to
inflict as much evil as he can to others in order to take joy from it. He would be a creation of GG,
or at any rate subordinate to GG, perhaps something like the Christian idea of Satan, but by no
means a god in the sense of the term intended as a being of unlimited power, intelligence, and
wisdom.
Objection I
Why can’t we just say that GG creates finite beings to benefit them, and EG to harm
them—hence the symmetry.
Response to objection I
According to theism, GG brings the world into existence to benefit humans. Why? To
benefit them. This pleases GG. And GG loves humans. Conversely, EG creates beings to harm
them. Why? To bring harm to them. This pleases EG and EG hates humans. Clearly, EG does
not love humans. Humans are instrumental in EG’s goal of maximizing evil. Thus, EG chooses
to create the universe and humans for his own benefit. Since EG hates humans, it follows that if
he could, he would maximize evil without them. And since EG is omnipotent and omniscient,
then he must be able to exist in a state of maximal evil without the need for creating creatures he
hates. However, the existence of the world runs counter to the alleged existence of EG. An EG
that is complete, who hates humans, does not bring about the world. One could point out that,
perhaps, EG creates out of an overflow of evil as GG creates out of an overflow of goodness,
which constitutes a symmetry. Still, in such a case, we have the following asymmetry. On the
one hand there exists GG. Assume that GG brings about creation out of an overflow of goodness
or even out of a ‘divine need.’ GG is wholly good and enjoys his creation. On the other hand,
allegedly EG is a wholly evil being. If he creates the world out of ‘divine need’ or out of an
overflow of hate, either way EG is somewhat disadvantaged by creation because he either
chooses or is required to create something that he does not enjoy—that is, he hates humans and
the world.
The EG challenger does not need to claim that EG creates the world for his own benefit.
But then what is the reason? Either a god is determined to create the world or he is not. If he is,
then he does not freely choose to create the world and does not do it for his personal benefit, but
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out of necessity. But if he creates out of necessity, then EG cannot be like GG because GG does
not create the world out of necessity but does it freely. And if he is not determined, then it
follows that he creates the world to benefit from it—in which case he is not complete, and thus
not a god.
Objection II
So what? Despite these asymmetries, it’s not important whether EG creates by necessity
or by free choice. The point is that it is possible that such a god exists.
Response to objection II
However, I think that the incompleteness argument is telling because it shows that a god
that creates the universe out of necessity would, by definition, lack the freedom to choose to do
so, thereby lacking the fundamental divine attribute of free will. Perhaps one might insist that
either (a) it is not true that GG created the world freely; creation was a necessity for him too. Or
(b) the necessity of creation might be an aspect of God’s free nature; in other words, a god might
have a necessity to create the world, but that fact does not undermine his free will. Maybe one of
these two options is true. But this is not the real issue here. The challenge rests on the assumption
of classical monotheism according to which God freely chooses to create the world for the
benefit of humans. For example, while the fine-tuning argument does not say anything about the
moral character of the creator, it does show that the creator purposely brings into existence the
universe with certain precise features that are conducive to human life. By symmetry, EG
chooses to fine-tune the universe in order to make human life possible; however, EG does so for
his own benefit—enjoying evil/maximizing evil. Thus, the evident asymmetry is that while God
freely creates the world for the benefit of humans, EG either creates the world out of necessity or
he does it for his own benefit. And in neither case can he be regarded as a god.
To emphasize even more this asymmetry, consider the following. One could argue that
God could have just loved himself without ever creating the world, but is able to love himself
more and differently if there are created beings. But then, by symmetry, would it not follow that
EG could have just hated himself without creation and hated himself more after creation? This
clearly leads to an absurdity. I suppose that the EG proponent would respond that EG without
creation loves himself and by creating the world and humans he can love himself more by
inflicting evil on humans. I have two responses. One is that according to theism God creates the
world and humans not because he can love himself more. A perfect being cannot love himself
more unless he lacks perfection. The other is that EG cannot love himself. In fact, the challenge
assumes that EG must be symmetrical to GG. Now, GG is wholly good, which means that he
does not have any hate in him. By symmetry, EG must be wholly evil, which means that he must
have no love in him. Put another way, GG simply cannot hate, either himself or his creation; by
symmetry, EG cannot love, either himself or his creation. Consequently, we are left with the
absurdity of a supposedly omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely wise being that hates himself. If
this line of reasoning does not show explicitly that EG is absurd and cannot exist, at least it casts
doubt on the claim that there could be a being who is perfect, endowed with maximal knowledge
and power who hates himself—and might hate himself more by creating the world.
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The other option is that EG is perfect and is not benefited by creation. But then, it is
implausible that he would create the world in the first place. GG seems to better explain
existence. Again, GG creates the world for us because he is good and knows that the world
benefits us. By symmetry, EG would have to create the world for our detriment because he is
evil and knows that the world is detrimental to us. However, EG could not care less about us, and
thus he does not create the world because it is detrimental to us. Rather, he creates the world
because it is beneficial to him; he needs it to maximize evil or to take joy out of human suffering.
Consequently, EG is benefited from creation, and thus he is not perfect—not a god. One may
observe that even GG is, in a way, benefitted from creation. He loves humans, after all, and that
pleases GG. However, as noted, GG could have existed without creation. In other words, EG
hates humans and yet he requires them. Conversely, GG loves humans, though he can exist
without them. This asymmetry is so significant that it shows that EG is simply an evil caricature
of GG, and thus not as plausible as GG. Naturally, the EG challenger would deny that EG creates
people for his own benefit. It is to harm them, he or she might insist. But there seems to be no
plausible explanation as to why a perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly wise god would
create creatures he hates just to harm them.
I don’t think the problems just described can be avoided. If EG is driven by its nature to
create the world and to maximize evil, he cannot choose, he is not free, to create the world and
humans to harm them, and so he is not a god. Alternatively, EG freely chooses to create the
world in order to maximize evil. But this implies that he does it for his own benefit, in which
case EG cannot be a god either. EG challengers cannot maintain both that EG freely chooses to
create the world in order to maximize evil and that there is no reason why he chooses to do so.
They cannot plausibly maintain that such is just the way EG operates. This shows that theism is
plausible because, accordingly, GG creates the world for a purpose, which is to benefit us. On
the other hand, maltheism is implausible. EG freely creates the world in order to maximize evil.
‘But why?’ the theist asks. And the only reply available to the EG challenger is, ‘Because that’s
the way it is!’ This is a significant asymmetry. But let us keep in mind that we are trying to
establish whether the existence of GG is as plausible as the existence of EG. Now what we have
produced is the following: an infinitely powerful, intelligent, perfect being, endowed with free
will who needs creation to accomplish his personal goal of maximizing evil, who knows that
harming innocent beings is wrong but nevertheless he does not care about them and creates them
in order to harm them anyway. Why? Because that’s the way it is. It must be replied that such a
being cannot exist or that the existence of such a being is significantly less plausible than the
existence of the God of theism.
Objection III
The conclusion of the incompleteness argument is assumed by the motives placed on
both GG and EG: Premise I. and II. seem asymmetrical because they are based on two different
views of god’s character. Either (a) GG/EG creates the world for his own satisfaction or (b)
GG/EG creates the world for our own benefit/detriment. You must apply (a) and (b) consistently.
If you do so, then it seems like the symmetry thesis is unaffected (both create to enjoy
good/evil). However, the argument holds the view that (b) cannot apply to EG. The reason given:
EG could not care less about us, and thus he does not create the world for us. If he does create
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the world, then it must be that EG is benefited from creation, and thus he is not perfect—not a
god.
Consider the following reflection in favor of (b). GG creates the world for our own
benefit. Take an example: imagine that a good teacher creates a brilliant, all-singing, all-dancing
scheme of work for a school that they are really going to enjoy—a school he will never visit, a
school that will never reach out and tell him how the scheme of work went (i.e. whether or not it
benefited the students). The teacher doesn’t reach out to the school—he has no interest. Why?
Because this teacher is complete without this knowledge. He can gain nothing from hearing of
the benefit the students received from their creation. He did it for the student’s own benefit.
Now, by analogy, a complete EG creates the world for our own detriment. Take the
example again: imagine an evil teacher who creates a horrific scheme of work that aims to subtly
corrupt the students. He never visits or hears from the school again. He doesn’t even reach out to
find out how it went because this evil-teacher is complete; he would gain nothing from hearing
of the detriment caused to the students. He did it for the student’s own suffering. In short, (b)
seems to apply to both accounts consistently.
Response to objection III
There are a number of problems with this objection. First, according to the challenge, EG
does not create the world for our detriment. Rather, he creates the world in order to maximize
evil to take joy from human suffering. If he does not create humans in the first place, then he will
not need to bring about their detriment. According to theism, GG creates the world for our
benefit and knows that we would like to be benefitted. But the symmetry breaks down with EG
because EG does not create the world for our detriment because we would like to be harmed.
Rather, he creates the world for our detriment. However, since EG is omniscient, he knows that
humans do not desire their detriment. In fact, as Law observes, EG is a crafty being that ‘dupes
humans into believing that he is good.’ And EG does need to be so deceiving precisely because
humans do not wish to be harmed (and would not worship an evil god who desires their
detriment). Thus, we may also consider that the reason why GG creates the world is so that
humans acknowledge him and worship him. On the other hand, EG cannot possibly create the
world in order to be worshipped by humans since humans would not worship an evil being that
desires their detriment. Second, in the evil teacher analogy, evil teacher never visits or hears
from the school again. He doesn’t even reach out to find out how it went because this evilteacher is complete. This, however, is a false analogy because EG must be involved with humans
in order to ensure that they experience the right amount of suffering, which is conducive to EG’s
goal of maximizing evil and take joy from it. Third, if EG is not benefitted by creation, and since
he hates humans, it is implausible that he chooses to create something that he hates. In other
words, if EG does not need humans, and he hates them, why would he bother bringing about the
universe, fine-tuning it, making sure that there is just the right amount of good in the world, and
duping humans into believing that he is good? There is one possible reason—because without
humans EG cannot accomplish his goal of maximizing evil. Thus, EG is not complete and cannot
be like GG.
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Asymmetry II. Asymmetries between theodicies
In his paper, John M. Collins seeks to extend Law’s challenge. He writes:
Consider, to give just several examples of familiar theodicies: (1) God gave us
free will in order to make possible morally virtuous actions, even though this
inevitably also makes possible morally vicious actions; (2) suffering is required
for our moral and spiritual growth; and (3) the suffering we undergo in our
lifetimes is more than compensated for by the eternal bliss of the afterlife.18
He then notes that these three theodicies are isomorphic to the reverse theodicies.
Namely, (1) free will is necessary for the possibility of free evil actions; (2) Happiness is
necessary for moral decay; and (3) the happiness we experience in our lifetimes is repaid for with
a life of misery.
Law asks, ‘How persuasive are our three reverse theodicies?’, and answers his own
question thus,
Intuitively, not at all. Rather than being taken seriously, they usually provoke amusement
among theists and non-theists alike. But this raises the question: if the reverse theodicies
are feeble and ineffective, why should we consider the standard theodicies any more
effective?19
I think that with a few clarifications, it can be shown that the traditional theodicies are not
symmetrical to the reverse theodicies. Also, the three theodicies are more effective than the
reverse theodicies.
(1) Possibilities and freedom. GG created humans with the capacity of free action—but
not in order for us to be able to perform virtuous action. Rather, he created the world for us
without limiting our possibilities of expression and action in order to enable humans to perform a
variety of free acts, learn scientific truths, build things, steal candies, tell lies, and so on. The
reason he gave us this capacity is because a world inhabited by free-willed beings is intrinsically
valuable, more valuable than a world inhabited by determined beings or by limitedly free beings.
Physical reality permits acts that we consider virtuous or vicious. Asymmetrically, EG creates
the world in such a way as to specifically allow humans to do virtuous acts because acting
virtuously is necessary to his scheme in order to maximize evil. In other words, GG creates the
world for us; virtuous and vicious acts are possibilities that result from our being free.
Conversely, EG creates the world for himself and allows good with the precise intent to generate
evil, in order to ultimately maximize evil. Put even simpler: God creates the world for us and it is
completely up to us to do good or to do evil; unlike EG who creates the world for himself and
specifically gives us good with the aim of taking it away in order to accentuate our suffering in
order to maximize evil. Consequently, free-will theodicy and its reverse are not symmetrical.

18
19

Collins, J.M. (2019) “The evil-god challenge: extended and defended”, Religious Studies 55: 85-109,, 2.
Law, 359.
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(II) Moral Growth. The theist does not have to maintain that suffering is required for
moral growth. A theist may put it this way. Since GG is a complete being, he is neither pleased
nor displeased by our actions. We are free and thus morally accountable for our actions. GG does
not require that we grow morally. If we do, it is good for us. If we don’t, it is bad for us.
Asymmetrically, EG is pleased if we suffer, displeased if we don’t. Also unlike GG, EG does
need the destruction of our characters. Again, GG creates a world of possibilities and it is up to
us to live in a way that is most beneficial to us. It is up to us whether or not we are racist, we go
to war, we live moral lives, we take care of our bodies, and we grow morally. Put simply: GG
creates the world allowing logical possibilities of free action and expression for our benefit. If we
build a virtuous character, it is good for us. If we build a vicious character, it is bad for us.
Asymmetrically, EG creates the world allowing logical possibilities of free action not for our
benefit but for his. EG does not allow us to do whatever we want. EG gives us freedom but in
order for him to accomplish a specific plan—maximizing evil. If there were a way for EG to
maximize evil without giving us freedom, EG would not give us freedom. An important
question is, if there is a way through which GG can maximize goodness without giving us
freedom, then why isn’t there a parallel whereby EG maximizes evil without giving us
freedom?20 My reply is that, since GG loves humans and wants to benefit them, even if he could
maximize goodness without freedom, he still gives humans freedom because his goal is their
goodness. Conversely, EG hates humans. Consequently, if he could maximize evil without
giving us freedom, it would seem that he would do just that. And since he is omnipotent and
omniscient, he can bring about such a world.
So, if we ultimately build a good character, it is good for us, but contrary to EG’s plans.
If our character is ultimately destroyed, this is bad for us, but good for him. In other words, GG
does not allow suffering for our moral growth; suffering results from human freedom.
Conversely, EG does expressly allow happiness in order to achieve our moral decay. Therefore,
moral-growth and moral-decay theodicies are not symmetrical.
(III) Eternal Bliss. The theist is not required to maintain that eternal bliss is a form of
repayment for the evil we undergo in our lifetimes. On theism, GG is not required to compensate
us with eternal bliss for what we have experienced in our lifetimes; moreover, we are not entitled
to expecting any compensation from GG because it is not GG, but we, who choose how to live.
Natural and moral evils are terrible, but they are aspects of physical reality resulting from GG’s
allowing all logical possibilities of action and expression permitted by our nature and the nature
of reality. In other words, eternal bliss is not GG’s reimbursement to us for damages suffered
during the course of our lifetime; for, GG has not wronged us in any way. In order to bring into
light this asymmetry, consider the following.
GG creates the world for our benefit. It is up to us to choose whether we want to be good
or evil. If we are good, GG is happy for us, if we’re evil, GG is not happy for us. In the afterlife,
good humans will unite with GG and experience eternal bliss; and evil humans will face
punishment accordingly. And since GG is good and merciful, those humans who were not good
will have a possibility of redemption. Suppose that all humans choose to be good during their
lifetimes on earth. No human is evil. What happens to them in the afterlife? Presumably, GG is
20
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happy for them and in the afterlife humans will all experience eternal bliss. And if they are all
evil, GG is not happy for them, and in the afterlife they will all experience the appropriate
punishment, with the possibility of redemption. Now consider the case of EG. EG creates the
world not for our benefit, and to harm humans. If all humans are good on Earth, in the afterlife
they will all be in a state of eternal damnation. Likewise, if they are all evil they will still all be
in a state of eternal evil, pain, and suffering. It would be absurd to argue that evil humans will be
rewarded in the afterlife by EG because EG by definition hates, and thus hates humans.
Furthermore, EG cannot be merciful. So, on theism eternal bliss is not GG’s form of repayment
to us for the suffering we have experienced in our lifetime. Conversely, eternal damnation is
EG’s form of repayment to us for living happily. Therefore, the eternal-bliss and the eternalmisery theodicies are not symmetrical.
Objection I
Why couldn’t EG want to be united with other evil agents, just as a GG might want to be
united with other good agents?
Answer to objection I
GG is omnibenevolent and thus loves all humans. However, EG is omnimalevolent and
thus hates all humans. After all, it has been argued that EG’s goal is to maximize evil. Consider
that it is true that according to theism evil humans will be punished in the afterlife. However,
since GG is wholly good and merciful and allows redemption, the idea is that, ultimately, all
humans will unite with GG and thereafter exist in a state of eternally bliss. However, since EG is
wholly evil and allows reverse redemption, the idea is that, symmetrically, ultimately all humans
will be separated from EG and thereafter exist in a state of eternally damnation. Moreover, since
EG hates humans it is not plausible that he would desire to unite with them.
Objection II
Maltheism faces the problem of good just like theism faces the problem of evil. The good
in the world constitutes evidence against EG’s existence.21 On both accounts, there exists the
same amount of good and evil. So, why does it matter that GG creates evil for the good of
freedom, but EG for the evil of freely chosen bad actions?
Answer to objection II
On the account presented, GG needs neither good nor evil. Good and evil result from
human freedom. On the other hand, EG does need good. As Law notes, EG gives us goods for a
moment so that, when it takes them away, we suffer even more than we would if we never had
them in the first place.22 Consider why EG creates the world—to take joy from human suffering
Law, 357; Lancaster-Thomas, A. (2018) “The Evil-god Challenge Part I: History and recent developments’,
Philosophy Compass 13 (7) 1-8; Lancaster-Thomas, A. (2018). The Evil-god Challenge Part II: Objections and
Responses, Philosophy Compass, 13, (8), 1-10.
22
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or to maximize evil. Conversely, consider why GG created the world—for our benefit, not for
his. Consider why EG allows good in the world—in order to maximize evil. A world that
contains some good is more evil than a wholly evil world.23 My point is that EG expressly allows
good in the world in order to maximize evil whereas GG does not allow evil to maximize good.
Rather, evil results from free human action. So, the existence of good and the existence of evil
are not symmetrical. More specifically, the existence of good is, as EG challengers note, a
problem for maltheism. That is, EG challengers must explain why EG (who is omnipotent) needs
the existence of good in the world in order to achieve the maximization of evil. However, since
GG does not require or allow evil, theism does not need to justify evil. In short, it is EG
challengers who have a problem of good because it is they who claim that EG requires good in
order to maximize evil. Conversely, since theism does not make the claim that evil is necessary
or allowed, the existence of evil is not a problem for theism. The main point here is that the
problem of good and the problem of evil are clearly asymmetrical.
Objection III
But it is not the same eschatological view being applied to both cases. When the same
view is applied, the problem of good/evil is symmetrical.
Answer to objection III
The EG challenger has two options: (1) he can say that EG also does not require or allow
good in the world. Rather, good results from human freedom. Or (2) GG does require evil in the
world. However, option (1) must be ruled out. As we have seen, Law claims that EG dupes
humans into believing he is good and that EG gives us goods so that when he takes them away
we suffer even more than we would if we never had those goods in the first place. Option (2) has
two problems.
First problem: Take Christianity as an example. Accordingly, GG does not need evil in
the world. Rather, ‘God created man in His own image…He created human beings to be like
Him and to have unhindered fellowship with Him.’24 By symmetry, what must the EG challenger
claim? He must say, I suppose, that EG created man not in his own image and created human
beings not to be like him—and certainly not to have unhindered fellowship with him (since he
hates them). Rather, he created human beings to torment them because human suffering is
conducive to the maximization of evil, which pleases EG. In short, according to classical
monotheism, GG does not require or allow evil. Thus, when the same eschatological view is
applied, the problem of good/evil is asymmetrical in that good is a problem for maltheism, but
evil is not a problem for theism.
Second problem: Assume that GG does require evil in the world in order to bring about
good. Still, on this assumption GG would allow evil for our ultimate benefit. However, neither
23

However, one may argue that a world that contains no good whatever is more evil than a world that contains some
good. It seems that even if EG takes good things away from us in order to produce evil, still the lives of some people
are very good, which seems a failure of EG. So it would seem that EG must not allow any good at all. But this, as I
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evil nor good benefits GG. On the other hand, EG requires good in order to bring about evil. He
requires good because it is conducive to the maximization of evil. And he requires the
maximization of evil in order to take joy in it. Note that this leads right back to the problem of
incompleteness.
General Objection
If the incompleteness argument and the asymmetry between theodicies are successful, do
these constitute significant asymmetries as the EG challenge demands? There are many
asymmetries highlighted in the literature—consider Collins’ response to creating lesser beings:
‘God’s grace does not require God to create beings not as excellent as God could have created,
but evil-God’s jealousy does require that it create beings less evil than itself - there is an
asymmetry that favors the diabolist.’25 Thus the question is whether the proposed asymmetries
defeat the EG challenge.
Response
Indeed, EG challengers have indicated a number of asymmetries. Some of them may be
minor, perhaps because they have not yet been fully developed. However, let us not forget that
the challenge is to explain why the existence of EG is significantly less plausible than the
existence of GG. To that end, if the incompleteness argument is successful, and the asymmetries
between theodicies and reverse theodicies are correct, together they constitute asymmetries that
form a strong cumulative case against the existence of EG. Let’s review these asymmetries: (I)
Incompleteness: GG is complete, EG is incomplete, and thus he cannot be a god. It is
significantly more plausible that there exists a good god who loves humans and thus creates them
than an evil god (who is claimed to be like God, i.e., infinitely, wise, powerful, and knowing)
who hates humans, and yet he creates them. It is significantly more plausible that there exists a
god who could continue to exist without creation but, in his infinite power and intelligence, he
creates humans to benefit them than a god who, despite his infinite power and intelligence, needs
creation in order to take pleasure from it/to maximize evil. Moreover, it is significantly more
plausible that there exists an omnipotent and omniscient being that creates humans out of love
than the existence of an evil god that hates humans and yet creates them and dupes them into
believing that he is good in order to take joy from human suffering. (II) Asymmetries between
theodicies: EG challengers claim that theodicies are symmetrical to reverse theodicies and the
problems of evil/good are symmetrical. However, if my exposition of the three theodicies above
are correct, two points have been established. (1) It is not true that the three theodicies are
symmetrical to the reverse theodicies. Consequently, theodicies are more effective than reverse
theodicies. (2) The problem of evil is not a real problem for theism because, accordingly, GG
does not allow or require evil to exist. Conversely, the problem of good is a problem for
maltheism because, accordingly, EG requires and purposely injects good into the world in order
to accomplish his personal plan of maximizing evil to take joy from human suffering. Therefore,
I believe that my discussions show that EG cannot be a coherent entity, while God can.

25
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Conclusion
We may, then, draw the following conclusion from the foregoing discussion: According
to the EG challenge, GG and EG are overall symmetrical; since EG is implausible, and since EG
and GG are claimed to be symmetrical, EG and GG are equally implausible. However, if the
arguments present in this paper are sound, I have identified two significant asymmetries that
undermine the symmetry thesis and shown that the existence of GG is quite plausible, while the
existence of EG is absurd or at least considerably less plausible than the existence of GG.
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